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Tax Burden, defined as the ratio of total tax revenues over personal income, is
frequently used to measure state tax policy. The authors analyze the empirical
relationship between changes in Tax Burden and changes in tax policies from
1987 to 2000 using states’ forecasts of revenue impacts of new tax legislation.
Their two major findings have important implications. First, they demonstrate
that income-induced, nontax policy changes are a significant determinant of
changes in Tax Burden. These income effects are likely to cause misinterpreta-
tion when Tax Burden is used as a variable in economic growth regressions.
Second, they estimate that approximately half of the total variation in Tax Bur-
den is due to changes in nontax policy factors. This finding quantifies the
extent of the ‘‘mismeasurement’’ problem that has been discussed, but not ana-
lyzed, in previous literature. In concluding, the authors promote the use of
alternative approaches for estimating the economic effects of taxes.
Keywords: tax policy; fiscal policy; Tax Burden; state economic development;
tax rates
1. Introduction
Conclusive evidence concerning the empirical relationship between state
tax policy and economic growth continues to be elusive in the academic
literature. Typically the relationship is analyzed by regressing an outcome
measure of interest (such as per capita personal income) on a tax policy
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variable. The resulting coefficient estimate is commonly used to advise
policy makers regarding the impact of tax policy proposals. The validity
of this interpretation depends crucially on the accuracy with which the tax
policy variable is measured.
Good measures of tax policy are difficult to construct from statutory
tax parameters due to substantial variation in ‘‘state tax base definitions,
rate structures and enforcement practices’’ (Helms 1985, 577). As a result,
most of the state and local economic development literature measures tax
rates with the variable Tax Burden, defined as the ratio of state (or state
and local) tax revenues to personal income (Wasylenko 1997, 42).1
The literature widely acknowledges that Tax Burden may be an impre-
cise measure of tax policy. Because of this wide recognition, researchers
often omit discussions of this potential imprecision (e.g., Yamarik 2000;
Tomljanovich 2004). Empirical studies of growth continue to proxy state
tax policy with Tax Burden because of its ease of availability and the lack
of better alternatives.2 This is regrettable, because this approach can lead
to the misinterpretation of empirical results and bad policy advice.
If movements in Tax Burden are driven by nontax policy factors that
are correlated with the outcome measure, then the resulting coefficient
estimates cannot be use to predict impacts of potential tax policy changes.
Theory suggests that this scenario is quite plausible: If state tax systems
are nonproportional, then changes in state income will induce changes in
Tax Burden. If the dependent variable is also income-related, then an
empirical relationship that has nothing to do with tax policy will be gener-
ated between Tax Burden and the dependent variable.
This study investigates how well Tax Burden measures state tax pol-
icy. We make several contributions. First, we empirically quantify the
relationship between changes in Tax Burden and changes in state tax pol-
icy. Following previous research, we use state-generated forecasts of
revenue impacts associated with new tax legislation as direct measures
of state tax policy. These serve as a proxy for changes in tax revenues
due to changes in tax policy, holding constant the influence of other vari-
ables (like income).
We further contribute to the literature by evaluating sources of diver-
gence between Tax Burden and state tax policy. We decompose changes
in Tax Burden into three mutually exclusive components: (1) changes in
state tax policy, (2) income-induced changes that are independent of tax
policy, and (3) changes caused by other factors that are independent of
state tax policy. We demonstrate the statistical significance of income-
induced changes in explaining variations in Tax Burden.
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Finally, we use our theory-driven empirical results to estimate the
percentage of variation in Tax Burden that is due to nontax policy factors.
Our preferred estimates indicate that approximately half of the variance in
the change of Tax Burden is due to factors other than state tax policy. Our
results are important for researchers and policy makers interested in the
effect of tax policy on economic growth. By empirically identifying the
substantial imprecision associated with using Tax Burden as a proxy for
state tax policy, we highlight the need for better measures.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 identifies two data series
that, we argue, provide objective and reliable measures of state tax policy.
Section 3 presents qualitative evidence that Tax Burden mismeasures state
tax policy. Section 4 derives a theoretical model relating our Tax Burden
variable to state tax policy and other factors. Section 5 presents the
empirical results including estimates of the degree to which changes in
Tax Burden are driven by nontax policy factors. Section 6 concludes with
suggestions for future research.
2. Direct Measures of State Tax Policy
To determine whether Tax Burden is a reliable measure of state tax policy,
we need to track and quantify changes in state tax policy. Total tax reven-
ues will not work, since these follow the business cycle, even when tax
policy does not change. Our approach employs the actual revenue fore-
casts used by states to assess the consequences of new tax legislation.
State laws generally require the budgetary impacts of tax and spending
legislation to be estimated. This information is collected by two national
organizations—the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO)
and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). Both organiza-
tions began conducting annual surveys of their membership regarding state
tax policy in 1987.
NASBO, in conjunction with the National Governors’ Association,
collects its information from state budget officers.3 Among other things,
respondents provide estimates of changes in the next fiscal year’s tax rev-
enues resulting from changes in tax legislation. NCSL collects its informa-
tion from state legislative staff.4 Historically, NCSL has used two methods
to report tax change impacts. The baseline method (NCSL-B), available as
an annual time series from 1987 to 1997, tracks tax legislation changes
adopted in a given year in terms of the impact on the following fiscal year.
It was discontinued in favor of the taxpayer liability method (NCSL-TL),
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which was initiated in 1995. The NCSL-TL series provides estimates of
changes in the taxes actually paid by taxpayers.5
In addition to definitional variations concerning the implementation of
tax changes, the NASBO and NCSL surveys also differ with respect to
when information is collected. Revisions in revenue forecasts may not be
picked up by both surveys. Figure 1 compares the NASBO- and NCSL-
collected state revenue forecasts associated with tax policy changes. Fiscal
year represents the year that the tax changes are legislated to take effect.
Despite some differences, the overall impression is that the different series
present similar pictures of predicted revenue changes attributed to state
tax policy changes.6 The sample correlation between the two series is .777
and is highly significant. When these series are converted to measures of
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Figure 1
A Comparison of Three Measures of State Tax Policy
Changes: NASBO, NCSL-B, and NCSL-TL
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tax policy as discussed in the next section, their correlation rises to .822.
In contrast, pairwise correlations between each of these measures and Tax
Burden are substantially lower at .384 (NASBO) and .398 (NCSL).7
We take as our point of departure that the forecasts collected by
NASBO and NCSL represent unbiased estimates of the revenue impacts
of changes in state tax policy. Corroborating support for employing this
assumption comes from three sources: (1) previous research on strategic
bias in state revenue forecasts; (2) personal conversations with profes-
sional staff at NASBO, NCSL, and state budgetary offices; and (3) the use
of these series in recent studies.
Although no studies directly evaluate the accuracy of state revenue
forecasts associated with tax legislation, some studies have investi-
gated state forecasts of total tax revenues.8 No conclusive evidence of
bias has been found.9 Even if states strategically bias total revenue
forecasts, however, this bias would not necessarily extend to revenue
forecasts of specific tax legislation. These latter forecasts are likely to
be more closely scrutinized than overall budget forecasts since they are
inputs in the legislative process and impact specific economic groups.
As such, they need to be credible to many different constituencies.10
Personal conversations with current and former professionals from
NASBO, NCSL, and several state budgetary offices provided anecdotal
confirmation that the survey responses supplied by the states are untainted
by strategic bias.
Finally, we note that several recent studies have employed the NASBO
and NCSL-collected revenue forecasts as direct measures of state tax pol-
icy. In particular, Poterba (1994), Poterba and Rueben (2001), and Maag
and Merriman (2003) used NASBO data. Merriman (2001) used both ser-
ies to predict changes in tax legislation.
3. Qualitative Evidence of
State Tax Policy Mismeasurement
In the analysis that follows, we define the variable Tax Burden as the ratio
of state (but not local) tax revenues (RÞ over personal income (YÞ,
Tax Burdenst =Rst=Ys;t−1: ð1Þ
We exclude local tax revenues to be consistent with the NASBO- and NCSL-
collected estimates. We take the relationship between this restricted version
of Tax Burden and state tax policy as an indication of the relationship
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between that of the more broadly defined Tax Burden variable and state and
local tax policy. Note that tax revenues are reported by fiscal year, while state
personal income is measured over the calendar year. Following convention,
personal income is from the calendar year that spans the beginning of
the fiscal year.11
As a starting point, we compare the Tax Burden time series with the
NASBO and NCSL-B time series for fiscal years 1988 to 2001.12 For a
few states (e.g., Iowa), the Tax Burden series seems reasonable as mea-
sures of state tax policy: it rises during years in which tax legislation was
projected to increase state revenues, declines during years in which tax
legislation was projected to decrease state revenues, and stays the same
when no change in revenues was expected. A careful examination of the
Tax Burden series for all the states, however, reveals that this is the excep-
tion, not the rule.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate two typical scenarios in which Tax Burden mis-
measures state tax policy. In Figure 2, large projected increases in Louisi-
ana’s taxes in 1989 had little effect on the state’s Tax Burden. Furthermore,
during the early 1990s, tax increases corresponded with a general decline in
the Tax Burden series. In contrast, Figure 3 shows large movements in
Michigan’s Tax Burden from 1988 through 1994 despite the negligible fore-
casted impacts of tax policy changes. Cases like Louisiana where significant
changes in state tax policy correspond with little, or even perverse, move-
ment in Tax Burden; and Michigan, where large movements in Tax Burden
are not generated by changes in tax legislation, are common.13
Figure 4 aggregates data from all the states to present an overall picture of
how well changes in Tax Burden correspond to changes in state tax policy.14
According to both the NASBO and NCSL-B measures, states legislated
increases in tax revenues on net every year between 1988 and 1994. Yet the
value of Tax Burden in 1994 was about the same as it was in 1988. States low-
ered taxes on net every year from 1996 to 2001. However, except for fiscal
year 2001, these tax cuts are not evident in the corresponding Tax Burden ser-
ies. Clearly, Tax Burden does not accurately track changes in state tax policies.
4. Theoretical Analysis Relating
Tax Burden and State Tax Policy
4.1 The Decomposition of Tax Burden
This section models the relationship between Tax Burden and state tax pol-
icy to clarify the empirical link. Following the literature, the relationship
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between a state’s tax revenues (RÞ and its income (YÞ is approximated with
a linear revenue function:15
Rst = b0;st + b1;stYs;t−1+ eRst; ð2Þ
where eRst is a mean-zero error term assumed to be uncorrelated with state
income. Thus, tax policy for state s at time t can be characterized by the
parameters (b0;st, b1;stÞ, where b1;st is the state’s effective marginal tax rate
on income at time t.
A ‘‘true’’ measure of the revenue change caused by a change in state
tax policy parameters in fiscal year t, which shows up in fiscal year
t+ 1 revenues, should hold income constant. This can be specified as
follows,
TaxesTruest =Taxesst|Y =b0;st +b1;st · Ys;t−1; ð3Þ
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Figure 2
Tax Burden versus Changes in State Tax Policy: Louisiana
410 Public Finance Review
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016pfr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
where b0;st is the component of tax changes that does not change with a state’s
income, and (b1; st · Ys;t−1Þ is the component of tax changes that are affected by
a state’s income.
Let us consider measuring the change in state tax policy by the change
in Tax Burden,
TaxBurdenst = TaxBurdens; t+1− TaxBurdenst = Rs;t+1
Yst
− Rst
Ys;t−1
: ð4Þ
Substituting equation (2) into equation (4), the relationship can be expressed as
TaxBurdenst=b1;st +
b0;st+1
Yst
− b0;st
Ys;t−1
 
+ e
R
s;t+1
Yst
− e
R
st
Ys;t−1
 !
: ð5Þ
Clearly, changes in state income (Ys;t, Ys; t−1Þ can cause changes in Tax
Burden even when there is no corresponding change in state tax policy
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Figure 3
Tax Burden versus Changes in State Tax Policy: Michigan
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parameters (b0;st= b0;st+1, b1;st= 0).16 As we shall subsequently demon-
strate, this is not the only problem associated with using Tax Burden to
measure the impact of changes in tax policy.
Substituting equation (3) into (5) yields the following:
TaxBurdenst = Taxes
True
st
Ys;t−1
+ b0;st+ 1 Ys; t−1− Yst
Ys;t−1Yst
 
+Zst; ð6Þ
where Zst=
eR
s;t+1
Yst
− eRst
Ys;t−1
 
, EðZstÞ= 0, and Zst is heteroscedastic and
autocorrelated.
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Figure 4
Tax Burden versus Changes in State Tax Policy: United States
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Equation (6) decomposes the change in Tax Burden into three com-
ponents. The first term is the change in Tax Burden due to the change
in state tax policy. The second term represents the change in Tax Bur-
den due to changes in income. The third term is composed of miscel-
laneous factors that are unrelated to state tax policy. The latter two
terms cause Tax Burden to mismeasure state tax policy. Estimation
of equation (6) would provide an indication of the extent of this
measurement error. Unfortunately, the policy variable TaxesTruest is
unobserved.
In the remainder of this section, we devise a strategy to estimate the
components of Tax Burden as a function of observable variables. Our key
insight consists of identifying the relationship between TaxesTruest and the
state revenue forecasts associated with tax policy changes collected by
NASBO and NCSL. A complication that we need to address is that these
latter forecasts incorporate changes in income, whereas TaxesTruest con-
sists of income-constant revenue changes.
4.2 A Consistent Estimator of
Tax Policy Using State Forecasts
Let the variable TaxesForecastst represent the NASBO/NCSL-collected
forecasts of the revenue change at time t + 1 attributed to a tax policy
change at time t. In the context of the model above,
TaxesForecastst =b0;st + b1;st ·YFst
  ð7Þ
where b0;st is the component of tax changes that does not change with a
state’s income,17 YFst is the forecasted value of state income for the next
year, and b1;st · YFst
 
is the component of tax changes that are affected
by a state’s income.18
We make two assumptions to express TaxesTruest as a function of
observables. First, we assume that b0;st = 0. It follows from equations
(3) and (7) that
TaxesTruest
Ys; t−1
= Taxes
Forecast
st
YFst
: ð8Þ
Note that previous studies estimating marginal tax rates impose the addi-
tional assumption of a linear revenue function that does not vary over
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time, that is, b1;st= 0, (e.g., Koester and Kormendi 1989; Becsi 1996).
In comparison, our approach is less restrictive. There is an additional
reason to support the assumption that b0;st= 0: as a practical matter, the
effect of this assumption is small. The appendix demonstrates that under
reasonable assumptions, the error associated with measuring TaxesTruest
using states’ forecasts of tax policy changes when b0;st 6¼ 0 will gener-
ally be less than 5 percent.
Our second assumption is that the relationship between the realized
and forecasted values of state income is given by
Yst = 1+ eFst
 
YFst ; ð9Þ
where eFst represents the percentage difference between the income fore-
cast developed by state budgeters and the realized value of state income,
and E eFst
 = 0.19
Substituting Equation (9) into Equation (8) produces the following
relationship,
TaxesForecastst
Yst
= Taxes
True
st
Ys;t−1
+ ust; ð10Þ
where ust= − Taxes
Forecast
st
Yst
· eFst , ust is heteroscedastic, and plim
T→∞
PT
t=1
ust
T
 
= 0.
Thus, the ratio of the observed variables TaxesForecastst and Yst is a consistent
estimate of the change in state tax policy in the sense that
PT
t=1
TaxesForecastst
Yst
.
T is
arbitrarily close to
PT
t=1
TaxesTruest
Ys;t−1
.
T for sufficiently large T .20
Using this consistent estimator of the unobserved variable
TaxesTruest

Ys;t−1 as a proxy in equation (6) yields the following estim-
able regression equation:
TaxBurdenst =a0+ a1 · Taxes
Forecast
st
Yst
+ a2;s Ys;t−1− Yst
Ys;t−1Yst
 
+ost; ð11Þ
where a2;s is a state-specific coefficient estimating b0;s.
21 The estimation is
at best suggestive, since TaxesForecastst

Yst measures Taxes
True
st

Ys;t−1
with error (cf. equation [10]).
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5. Estimation of the Tax Burden and
State Tax Policy Relationship
5.1 Estimation of Equation (11)
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 report the results of estimating equation
(11) using the NASBO- and NCSL-collected state revenue forecasts,
respectively. The NASBO data consist of 658 annual observations of 47
states over the years 1987 to 2000.22 The NCSL data consist of 517 obser-
vations of the same 47 states over the years 1987 to 1997. Coefficients are
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors.
We use the ‘‘White period robust coefficient variance estimator’’ (Quanti-
tative Micro Software 2004, 854) to accommodate both arbitrary serial
correlation and time-varying variances in the error terms. This is appropri-
ate given the error structure defined by equation (6) above.
The first explanatory variable in the NASBO-1 and NCSL-1 specifications
is TaxesForecastst

Yst, which we demonstrated to be a consistent estimator of
state tax policy. Both the NASBO and NCSL specifications indicate that
TaxesForecastst

Yst is positively and significantly associated with Tax Bur-
den. The t-values are quite high: 10.00 and 8.77, respectively. This result is
consistent with equation (11) and provides evidence that Tax Burden cap-
tures, at least in part, the effects of actual state tax policy.
It is not unexpected that both of the estimated coefficients are less than 1
(0.5872 and 0.5578, respectively) given that TaxesForecastst

Yst measures
state tax policy with error. Although designed to measure the same impacts,
the NASBO and NCSL revenue forecasts are imperfectly correlated (the
sample correlation of the two series is .777). This is testimony to the diffi-
culty of accurately measuring the revenue impacts of tax legislation. Never-
theless, the empirical results using these two different measures are quite
similar, and continue to be so in subsequent specifications reported below.
Equation (11) also predicts that Tax Burden will reflect changes in
factors not related to tax policy. Of particular interest are the forty-seven
state-specific interaction terms (corresponding to the term a2;s
Ys;t−1 − Yst
Ys;t−1Yst
 
Þ, which reflect the influence of changes in state income not
associated with state tax policy. Although we do not report the forty-seven
individual coefficient estimates (a^2;s’s) due to space constraints, approxi-
mately three-fourths are individually significant at the 5 percent level. We
test the hypothesis that these forty-seven coefficients are jointly equal to
zero, corresponding to a test that Tax Burden is unaffected by nontax
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policy–related movements in state income. The results are reported at the
bottom of columns (1) and (2) in Table 1. The hypothesis is soundly
rejected in both specifications, with p-values well below .01 percent (cf.
‘‘Hypothesis Test: State-Specific Interaction Terms’’ in Table 1). These
results provide empirical evidence that changes in state income induce
significant movement in the Tax Burden variable, causing the Tax Burden
variable to change even when there has been no change in state tax policy.
The results of columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 also provide suggestive
evidence of the influence of other, nontax policy related factors. Recall
that the error term in equation (11), ωst, represents all other factors that
can cause Tax Burden to mismeasure tax policy. The more important these
factors are, the larger the error term and the lower the R2 of the equation.
In fact, both specifications are characterized by low R2 values: .209 and
.273, respectively. Of course, this is only suggestive, since other factors,
such as using an imperfect measure for TaxesTruest

Ys;t−1, would also
depress R2.
Although the theory of equation (11) specifies the change in income
terms to be interacted with state-specific dummy variables, this specifica-
tion is admittedly unorthodox. It raises concerns that the significance of
these terms may be spurious, reflecting the influence of (omitted) state-
fixed effects. To address this concern, the equations in columns (1) and (2)
of Table 1 were respecified by including the
Ys;t−1 −Yst
Ys;t−1Yst
 
term without
interactions and adding state-fixed effects separately. The results are
reported in columns (3) and (4) as specifications NASBO-2 and NCSL-2.
To compare these (nonnested) specifications, we employ two model
selection criteria. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). Lower criterion values represent
‘‘better’’ models. Both the AIC and SIC criteria select the specifications of
columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 over those of columns (3) and (4), respec-
tively. In other words, the unorthodox specifications that arise from the
theory are preferred to the more usual, fixed effects specification. This
provides corroborating evidence in favor of the theory.
We perform one additional robustness check: Figure 4 suggests that Tax
Burden is characterized by cyclical behavior. Accordingly, we add time-
fixed effects to the specifications of columns (1) through (4) of Table 1 and
repeat our analysis. The results are reported in specifications (5) through
(8).23
The AIC and SIC conclusions regarding whether the addition of time-
fixed effects improves the specifications are somewhat different. Based on
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the AIC, time-fixed effects always improve the specification. In contrast,
based on the SIC, only the NASBO specifications are improved by the addi-
tion of time-fixed effects. As a practical matter, however, our main results
are unaffected: (1) the estimated coefficient on the TaxesForecastst

Yst vari-
able is approximately equal to 0.6 across all specifications; (2) the hypoth-
esis that the state-specific interaction terms have coefficients equal to zero
is always soundly rejected; and (3) the theory-driven specifications are
always preferred to the ad hoc, state-fixed effects specifications.
5.2 The Importance of Nontax Policy Factors on Tax Burden
The preceding analysis finds statistically significant relationships
between the Tax Burden variable and both tax policy and nontax policy
variables. From a mismeasurement perspective, we really would like to
know how much of the movement in Tax Burden is due to factors other
than state tax policy. This section takes three approaches to answering this
question.
The first approach estimates a simple regression model with Tax Bur-
den as the dependent variable and TaxesForecastst

Yst as the single explana-
tory variable. The R2 from this equation provides an estimate of how
much of the variance of Tax Burden is due to state tax policy. It follows
that 1 – R2 provides an estimate of how much of the variance is due to
nontax policy factors. The results from this analysis are reported in the
first row of Table 2. Approximately 87.1 percent of the variance of Tax
Burden cannot be ‘‘explained’’ by the NASBO-measured tax policy vari-
able, TaxesForecastst

Yst, and can correspondingly be attributed to nontax
policy factors. The corresponding value is 84.1 percent when we use the
NCSL-measure of state tax policy.
One problem with this simple approach is that the estimate of the effect
of tax policy may be biased by the omission of other variables from the
regression equation. Our second approach addresses this problem by
employing the NASBO-3 and NCSL-3 specifications from Table 1, which
include a large number of control variables. To isolate the effect of tax pol-
icy, we use the estimated coefficients from these specifications, fix the other
variables in the equation at their sample means, and then obtain predicted
values for Tax Burden. The variance in these predicted Tax Burden
values allows us to compute the percentage of the total variance in Tax
Burden that can be attributed to changes in state tax policy. It follows that
the remaining variance becomes an estimate of the amount of variation in
Tax Burden that can be attributed to nontax policy factors. The results
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from this analysis are reported in the second row of Table 2. Based on the
NASBO estimates of state tax policy, this approach leads to an estimate that
84.1 percent of the variance inTax Burden is due to nontax policy factors.
The corresponding value using the NCSL estimates is 81.8 percent.
One can also find fault with this second approach. Measurement error
in the NASBO and NCSL estimates is expected to cause the estimated
coefficient of TaxesForecastst

Yst to be biased towards zero. This would
dampen the predicted effect of tax policy on Tax Burden and lead to an
underestimation of the portion of Tax Burden attributable to state tax
policy. We address this problem by imposing the restriction from equation
(6) that the coefficient on the tax policy variable should equal one.
Restricted OLS estimation of the NASBO-3 and NCSL-3 models produces
consistent estimates of the other coefficients in the equation, subject to the
restriction being true. These coefficient estimates are then used to generate
predicted values of Tax Burden, again fixing the other variables in the
equation at their mean levels.
Table 2
Estimating the Importance of Nontax Policy
Factors as Determinants of Tax Burden
Approach Description NASBO NCSL
1a Percentage variance of TaxBurden ‘‘explained’’ by nontax
policy factors (no control variables)
87.1 84.1
2b Percentage variance of TaxBurden ‘‘explained’’ by nontax
policy factors (with control variables,
b
ðTaxes
Forecast
st
Yst
Þ
= b^
ðTaxes
Forecast
st
Yst
Þ
Þ
84.1 81.8
3c Percentage variance of TaxBurden ‘‘explained’’
by nontax policy factors (with control variables,
b
ðTaxes
Forecast
st
Yst
Þ
= 1Þ
56.8 44.9
Note: NASBO = National Association of State Budget Officers; NCSL = National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures.
a. TaxBurden is regressed on TaxesForecastst =Yst . The ‘‘percentage variance ‘explained’ by
nontax policy factors’’ is 1−R2 from this regression.
b. The estimated coefficients from the NASBO 3 and NCSL 3 specifications of Table 1
are used to construct predicted values for TaxBurden. The ‘‘percentage variance
‘explained’ by nontax policy factors’’ equals 1 minus the ratio of the variance in these pre-
dicted values over the total sample variance of TaxBurden.
c. This is similar to the previous approach, except that NASBO 3 and NCSL 3 specifica-
tions are reestimated with the restriction that the coefficient on TaxesForecastst =Yst equals 1. These
(restricted) coefficient estimates are then used to construct predicted values for TaxBurden.
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Forcing the coefficient on TaxesForecastst

Yst to equal one serves to
greatly increase the amount of variation in Tax Burden ‘‘explained’’ by
state tax policy. Correspondingly, this decreases the amount ‘‘explained’’
by nontax policy factors. The third row of Table 2 gives estimates of the lat-
ter. Using this third approach, we find that nontax policy factors ‘‘explain’’
56.8 percent of the variance of Tax Burden using the NASBO data and
44.9 percent of the variance ofTax Burden using the NCSL data.
If we take the calculations from this third approach as our preferred
estimates, we are still left with the conclusion that a large portion of the
movement in the Tax Burden variable, roughly half of its variance, is due
to factors that are unrelated to state tax policy. This is consistent with the
qualitative evidence presented in Figures 1 through 4.
6. Conclusion
This article investigates whether the variable Tax Burden, widely used in
empirical studies of taxes and economic growth, reliably measures state
tax policy. We have some good news: our findings indicate that changes
in Tax Burden are positively and significantly related to changes in state
tax policy. Unfortunately, we also find evidence of substantial measure-
ment error.
We decompose Tax Burden changes into three components: (1) changes
in state tax policy, (2) income-induced changes in revenue that do not mea-
sure state tax policy, and (3) other factors that do not measure state tax pol-
icy. The latter two categories constitute measurement error with respect to
measuring state tax policy. Our empirical analysis establishes the quantita-
tive and statistical importance of the second component. In other words, we
demonstrate that changes in state income cause Tax Burden to change even
when there has been no change in policy. This is of particular concern
because many studies that attempt to measure the impact of taxes use an
income-based dependent variable. Income-generated movement in the Tax
Burden variable will induce a correlation between it and the dependent vari-
able that is unrelated to state tax policy.
Last, our theoretical framework allows us to estimate the importance
of nontax policy factors as determinants of changes in Tax Burden. Our
preferred estimates indicate that approximately half of the variance in
changes in Tax Burden is due to nontax policy factors. This constitutes a
serious concern for those who rely on Tax Burden to provide an accurate
measure of state tax policy.
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Our findings should be of particular interest to researchers and
policy makers interested in measuring the effects of state tax policy.
On a positive note, this study demonstrates how state revenue forecasts
can be used to construct consistent measures of state tax policy. These
forecast data will become increasingly attractive as the respective time
series lengthen over time.
In the meantime, instrumental variables remain a potentially fruitful
way to address measurement error bias in Tax Burden. Statutory tax
parameters (e.g., property and sales tax rates, including information on
the tax base; income tax rate parameters, including bracket and tax credit
data) are obvious candidates for instruments. In addition, researchers
may find it useful to pursue alternative methodologies for measuring and
estimating tax effects such as representative agent models (e.g., Fisher
and Peters 1998) and new, quasi-experimental methods (e.g., Reed and
Rogers 2003, 2004).
Appendix
The Error Associated with Measuring ∆TaxesTruest

Ys;t−1
with ∆TaxesForecastst

Yst When ∆β0;st 6¼ 0
Define the error associated with measuring TaxesTruest

Ys;t−1 with
TaxesForecastst

Yst when b0;st 6¼ 0 by
Error=
TaxesForecastst
YFst
 
− TaxesTruest
Ys;t−1
TaxesTruest
Ys;t−1
: ðA1Þ
Substituting equations (3) and (7) into (A1) and performing some alge-
braic manipulation yields
Error=
b0;st
YFst
YF
s;t− 1
 
−b0;st
b0;st+b1;st · Ys;t−1
  : ðA2Þ
Note that when b0;st = 0, Error = 0.
Define kst such that
b0;st = kst · ðb1;stYs;t−1Þ: ðA3Þ
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Thus, if kst = 1, the component of total new taxes that is independent of
state income, b0;st, is equal to the component of total new taxes that is
dependent on the value of state income, (b1;stYs;t−1Þ.24 Substituting (A3)
into (A2) and doing some manipulation yields
Error=
−kst 1− Ys;t−1YFst
 
1+ kst : ðA4Þ
We now define a new variable, gst, such that
YFst = 1+ gstð Þ · Ys;t−1: ðA5Þ
Thus, gst is the forecasted annual growth rate of personal income. Substi-
tuting (A5) into (A4) and performing some algebraic manipulation yields
Error=
−kst gst1+ gst
 
1+ kst : ðA6Þ
We are now in a position to estimate the size of the error. The annual
growth rate of (nominal) state personal income from 1970 to 2000 is
approximately 6 percent. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the changes in
total taxes that were independent of income would ever be as large as the
portion that is dependent on income. Accordingly, if we substitute ‘‘upper
bound’’ values of gst= 0.10 and kst= 1, we get Error= − 0.045 = − 4.5
percent. This constitutes the basis for our claim that ‘‘the error associated
with measuring TaxesTruest

Ys;t−1 by TaxesForecastst

Yst when b0;st 6¼ 0
will generally be less than 5 percent.’’
Notes
1. Alternative names for this variable include average Tax Burden, average state tax rate,
effective average state tax rate, and tax share.
2. Helms (1985, 577) argued that the use of Tax Burden to measure tax policy presents
less severe problems compared with other feasible measures.
3. National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) estimates are reported in a
series titled The Fiscal Survey of the States (National Governors’ Association and NASBO
1987-2002). The latest estimates are available online at www.nasbo.org.
4. National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) estimates are published in State
Budget Actions (1987-1989), State Budget and Tax Actions (1990-1991), and State Tax
Actions (1992-2002).
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5. For example, if tax increases are phased in over a three-year period, the tax liability
method shows three years of increases, whereas the baseline method only shows changes in
the first year. Furthermore, if the legislature extends (postpones) a tax increase that was pre-
viously scheduled to expire (take effect), the tax liability method would indicate no change in
taxes, while the baseline measure would indicate an increase (decrease). See State Tax
Actions (NCSL 1996) for a comparison of the treatment of tax changes under both methods.
6. See Merriman (2000) for further discussions of the NASBO and NCSL estimates.
7. The Tax Burden variable used for these correlations is defined below.
8. Policy makers might want to overstate or understate expected revenues for various
reasons including partisan politics (Rodgers and Joyce 1996). Some researchers stress the
focus on minimizing the costs associated with inaccurate forecasts. Budget shortfalls cause
cuts in program spending while surpluses can be seen as evidence of excessive tax rates or
the underfunding of public goods (Feenberg et al. 1989).
9. Bretschneider and Gorr (1992) found that a complicated mix of partisan politics and
fiscal stress factors drive forecast errors in sales tax revenues. In contrast, Mocan and Azad
(1995) found no systematic bias in general fund revenues and little evidence of political and
institutional influences as a whole.
10. Corroborating this interpretation are the similarities in the NASBO and NCSL
estimates (cf. Figure 1), despite originating from organizations facing different political
pressures.
11. For example, Tax Burden for 1996 would have tax revenues corresponding to fiscal
year 1996 (which typically runs from July 1, 1995 through June 30, 1996) divided by perso-
nal income for calendar year 1995.
12. The NCSL–Taxpayer Liability (NCSL-TL) series is omitted because it is available
for only a small number of years. 2001 is the most recent year for which Tax Burden could
be calculated.
13. Figures representing Tax Burden time series for each state may be accessed via the
Internet at http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/R/Cynthia.Rogers-1/TAX/TAXBURDEN.htm.
14. In Figure 4, Tax Burden for the United States is calculated as the ratio of the sum of
state tax revenues for the United States over national personal income.
15. See, for example, Koester and Kormendi (1989) and Mullen and Williams (1994).
16. If state tax policy stays constant, then equation (5) implies that an increase in income
(i.e., Yst > Ys;t1) will cause a decrease in Tax Burden in a state with a regressive tax struc-
ture (b0;st > 0).
17. Note that the NASBO/NCSL-collected forecasts consist solely of taxes, excluding fees.
18. TaxesForecastst is the same variable that Poterba (1994) called ‘‘ TAXNEXTst.’’
19. Note that the ‘‘next’’ year is Yst, since the budget forecast is made at the beginning
of fiscal year t, which begins in the calendar year corresponding to Ys;t−1.
20. The measurement error in TaxesForecastst

Yst stems from errors in forecasting next
year’s state income (eFstÞ. In contrast, the measurement error in Tax Burdenst is due to
changes in income as well as miscellaneous factors that are unrelated to state tax policy.
These measurement errors have different consequences.
21. The reader may note that the error term in equation (11) includes the components
eRs;t+1
.
Yst and eRst

Ys;t−1, where Yst and Ys;t−1 also appear as explanatory variables in the second
term. However, recall that EðeRstÞ= 0 and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the income variable.
424 Public Finance Review
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016pfr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
22. Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming were omitted, the latter because its Tax Burden
values, like Alaska’s, have been greatly impacted by fluctuations in oil prices and production.
23. We also estimated specifications that added both state- and time-fixed effects to the
NASBO-1 and NCSL-1 models, but these were strictly dominated by the specifications with
just time-fixed effects.
24. Strictly speaking, this should read ‘‘the component of total new taxes that is depen-
dent on the value of state income assuming state income stays constant.’’
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